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This paper develops rules for ordering uncertain price prospects. For consumers with 
identical ordinal preferences, we propose stochastic dominance rules based on equivalent 
variation (EVl. The second-degree stochastic dominance (SSD) rule on the induced 
distributions of EV yields a unanimous ranking among income risk a verters. The SSD 
rule on consumer surplus or compensating variation provides a valid ranking for income 
risk averters if the income elasticity of demand is zero. Risk averse consumers with 
different ordinal preferences cannot have a unanimous ranking of price prospects. We 
delineate two classes of risk averse consumers that have opposing rankings of price 
prospects with the same mean. 
STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE AND UNCERTAIN PRICE PROSPECTS 
I. Introduction 
Since the seminal and simultaneous publications of Hadar and Russell (1969) 
and Hanoch and Levy ( 1969) there has been a virtual explosion of papers 
investigating implications of stochastic dominance rules for decisions under 
uncertainty.! Dominance principles have important applications to portfolio 
choice, capital budgeting and financial intermediation. Stochastic dominance can 
also be applied to investment and production decision problems under uncertainty. 
In these areas, both overall and marginal impacts of uncertainty have received 
wide attention. 2 
The emphasis in consumer welfare analysis under uncertainty has been on 
the ranking of different price prospects. Ranking of price prospects is more 
complicated than that of income prospects for two related reasons. First, due to 
differences in ordinal preferences among consumers, the second degree stochastic 
dominance rule on price prospects does not yield a unanimous ranking among risk 
averse consumers. The literature has thus focused on the ranking of price 
prospects for a single consumer or consumers with identical ordinal preferences 
(e.g. Waugh, 1944; Massell, 1969; Samuelson, 1972). Second, there is no a priori 
reason for income risk averse consumers to exhibit aversion to fair price risks. 
Specifically, the indirect utility function of a risk averse consumer is neither 
concave nor convex in prices. Indirect ways of comparing consumer welfare 
under alternative price prospects - via expected consumer surplus, expected 
compensating variation or expected equivalent variation - have thus been 
investigated in the literature. 
Expected consumer surplus (ECS) has been particularly popular for ranking 
certain and uncertain price prospects.3 However, Turnovsky, Shalit and Schmitz 
(1980) showed that the ranking of price prospects based on ECS is generally 
2 
inconsistent with the expected utility criterion. Specifically, they pointed out 
that ECS is an accurate measure of change in utility only if the marginal utility 
of income is independent of the random price, i.e., if the relative risk aversion 
index equals the income elasticity of demand. Thus, for instance, if the consumer 
is risk neutral and the income elasticity of demand is zero, ECS provides a 
correct ranking of certain and uncertain price prospects. Subsequently, Helms 
( 1985a) demonstrated that expected compensating variation (ECV) yields a valid 
ranking of certain and uncertain price prospects, if the relative risk aversion 
index equals twice the income elasticity of demand4 
Since the consumer surplus approach imposes "stringent" restrictions on 
ordinal preferences, Turnovsky, Shalit and Schmitz (1980, p. 136) suggested that 
evaluation of certain or uncertain price prospects be based on consumer's 
expected indirect utility.5 This paper provides two sets of rules for ordering 
uncertain price prospects that are consistent with expected utility. For consumers 
with identical ordinal preferences, we propose stochastic dominance rules based on 
the induced distributions of equivalent variation (EV). For given ordinal 
preferences, the SSD rule for the induced distributions of EV yields a unanimous 
ranking of induced income prospects among risk averters. Moreover, the SSD rule 
for the induced prospects of EV is the only criterion for risk averters that is 
consistent with the expected utility criterion. The SSD rule for consumer surplus 
(CS) or compensating variation (CV) provides a valid ranking of price prospects 
for income risk averters if and only if the income elasticity of demand is zero, in 
which case CV and CS coincide with EV. If the income elasticity of demand is 
not zero, then the SSD rule for the induced distributions of CS or CV yields a 
ranking of price prospects that is inconsistent with expected utility. 
!' 
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If consumers have different ordinal preference orderings on commodity 
bundles, they will demand different "equivalent" variations in income from a price 
change. Thus, induced distributions of EV cannot be used to compare price 
prospects for consumers with different Ql'dinal preferences. Moreover, risk 
averse consumers with different ordinal preferences cannot have a unanimous 
ranking of price prospects. However, it is possible to have a unanimous ranking 
for some subsets of risk averse consumers. We delineate two classes of risk 
averse consumers that have opposite rankings of price prospects. 
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 investigates two rules, based 
on induced distributions of EV, for ranking price prospects for consumers with 
identical ordinal preference orderings. Section 3 examines the SSD rule for 
induced distributions of CS and CV. Section 4 relaxes the assumption of identical 
ordinal preferences and delineates two classes of utility functions with conflicting 
rankings of price prospects. Section 5 contains a brief summary and concluding 
remarks. 
2. Ranking of Price Prospects with Identical Ordinal Preferences 
The literature has compared certain price and uncertain price prospects using 
consumer surplus of the representative consumer with the implicit assumption that 
consumers have identical ordinal preferences. Thus, we first compare price 
prospects for consumers with identical ordinal preferences and compare our results 
with the literature. The proposed rules for consumers with identical ordinal 
preferences are based-on the induced distributions of equivalent variation (EY). 
Marshallian consumer surplus (CS) and Hicksian compensating variation (CV) also 
summarize ordinal preferences, and the rankings of price prospects based on 
induced distributions of CS and CV are considered in the next section. 
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Imagine a consumer who allocates a given income I between good X whose 
price is uncertain and a composite good Y whose price is certain, equal to unity. 
The numeraire good Y represents the consumption of all goods, exclusive of X. 
Let u(X, Y) be the direct utility function, and let X(p,I) and Y(p,I) denote the 
demand functions obtained by maximizing u(X, Y) subject to the budget constraint, 
I = pX + Y. The demand functions also generate an indirect utility function 
V(p,I) and an expenditure function e(p,u). 
Consider a change in the price of X from s to p. The minimum amount of 
compensation w that the consumer with income I demands at price s, in order to 
maintain the same level of utility obtained at price p, is implicitly defined by 
V(p,l) = V(s,l + w). (I ) 
The "equivalent" variation in income w can be explicitly written 
w(s,p,I) = e(s,V(p,I)) - I. (2) 
From the definition in (I), we note that equivalent variation (EV) provides a 
correct ranking of certain prices. That is, V(PJ ,I) 2! V(pz,l) if and only if 
w(s,p~ol) 2! w(s,p2,I) for somes. Moreover, the ranking on EV is independent of 
the reference prices, i.e., w(s,pl,l) 2! w(s,p2,I) for somes implies w(S,PJ,S) 2! 
w(s,p2,I) for all s.6 It should be noted that the EV function is derived from the 
expenditure function and hence reflects ordinal preferences. Thus, "equivalent" 
variations in income from a price change will be different between consumers 
with distinct ordinal preferences. 
Note that if p is a random variable, so is the equivalent variation w(s,p,I). 
Let F(p) be a price distribution and F(p) be the class of all price distributions. 
Since the equivalent variation w(s,p,I) is a random variable, the price distribution 
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F(p) induces a distribution of equivalent variation, F(w). Taking expectations of 
(I), we obtain 
EFV(p,l) "' EFV(s,l + w(s,p,l)) "' Ef:.Y(s,I + w). (3) 
Let F(w) be the class of all distributions of EV, and let a and b be constants 
such that F(a) = 0 and F(b) = I for all F E F. 
Hadar and Russell (1969) and Hanoch and Levy ( 1969) defined two types of 
stochastic dominance for income prospects. To distinguish them from the 
dominance relations for price prospects, we reproduce definitions of First Degree 
Stochastic Dominance (FSD) and Second Degree Stochastic Dominance (SSD) using 
equivalent variation. Let 
w 
F*(w) = f F(t}dt, 
a 
w 
G*<w> = f G(t)dt. 
a 
Definition 1: F(w) D1 G(w) if F(w) s. G(w) for all w and the strict 
inequality holds for some w. 
Definition 2: F(w) Dz G(w) if Fo(w) s. G*(w) for all w and the strict 
inequality holds for some w. 
We now compare expected utilities under two price prospects, F(p) and G(p}, 
using the induced distributions, F(w) and G(w). The difference in expected 
utilities is given by 
b 
Et;-V - E(;V = f V(s,l + w)d[F(w) - G(w)]. 
a 
( 4) 
It should be noted that here we are concerned with a conditional ranking of price 
prospects, F(p) and G(p}, for a given income I. Since an increase in income 
changes demand and the expected utilities under the two price distributions, 
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ordering of uncertain price prospects is affected by changes in income. 
Integrating (4) by parts gives 
b 
EtV - EtJV = V(s,l + b)[F(b) - G(b}] - f VI(s,I + w)[F(w) - G(w)]dw 
a 
b 
= - f vi(s,I + wJ£F(wJ - G(w}Jctw 
a 
(5) 
since F(a) = G(a) = 0 and F(b) = G(b) = I. Let VI = (V(p,l + w): VI> 0} be the 
class of all indirect utility functions that are monotone increasing in income. 
Then 
PROPOSITION l: F(w) D1 G(w) iff EtV(s,l + w) <:_ EtJV(s,l + w) 
for all V E VI· 
Thus, the FSD rule holds for all individuals with indirect utility functions that 
are monotone increasing in income.? Note that differences in ordinal preferences 
are irrelevant for the ranking of the two prospects since the FSD rule is defined 
in terms of EVs which incorporate ordinal preferences. However, a distribution 
F(w) implies distinct price prospects for individuals with different ordinal 
preference orderings. 
We now develop a rule for ordering uncertain price prospects for income risk 
averters, using the induced distributions of EV. Let 
w 
f:•(w) = f F(t}dt, 
a 
Integrating (4) by parts yields 
w 
b•<wl = f G(tJdt. 
a 
Ef:V - EtJV = - v1(s,I + b)[f:•(b) - b•(b)J 
b 




Let Vu = (V(s,I + w): Vr > 0 and Vu 5. 0} be the class of all indirect utility 
functions that are monotone increasing and concave in income. Since the right 
side of (6) is a weighted sum of [F*(w)- G*(w)], using (-VI) and Yn as weights, 
the necessary and sufficient condition for E~V:!:. Ei:;V is that F*(w) 5. G*(w) for 
all w, as Hadar and Russell (1969) have shown. Thus, we have 
PROPOSITION 2: F(w) D2 G(w) iff E~V(s,I + w) :!:. E(}V(s,I + w) 
for all V E Vu. 
A price variation is "equivalent" to a change in income. Recall that EVs are the 
same for consumers with identical ordinal preferences. Thus, it is possible to 
rank uncertain price prospects indirectly by comparing the induced distributions of 
EV. We have shown that the necessary and sufficient condition for all income 
risk averters with identical ordinal preferences to prefer one price prospect to 
another is that an SSD relationship holds between the induced distributions of EV. 
Since Proposition 2 is stated for a given stable price s, which is used as a 
common reference price to obtain the induced distributions of EV, one might 
suspect that the ranking of price prospects depends on the choice of the stable 
reference prices. However, using the definition of expected utility in (3), EFV:!:. 
EoV implies E~V(s,I + w):!:. E(}V(s,I + w) for all s. Conversely, E~V(s,I + w):!:. 
Et;V(s,I + w) for some s implies EFV :!:. Eo V. Thus, the ranking of price 
prospects, F(p) and G(p ), is independent of the choice of the stable reference 
price s. This implies that if F*(w) 5. G*(w) for some s, then not only all risk 
averse consumers prefer f:*(w) to G*(w) and hence F(p) to G(p), but the 
inequality f*(w') 5. G*(w') also holds for any other reference price s', where w' = 
w(s',p,I). Thus, an alternative version of Proposition 2 can be written: 
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PROPOSITION 2': F(w) D2 G(w) for all s, iff 
EFV(p,I) 2:. EGV(p,I) for all V E Vn. 
We conclude this section by noting that ranking price prospects by FSD and 
SSD rules on the induced distributions of EV are as practical as ordering income 
prospects. The use consumer surplus in applied welfare analyses presupposes some 
knowledge of the properties of the demand functions (e.g. income and price 
elasticities) or expenditure functions. Once the demand or expenditure functions 
are known, compensated demand curves can be constructed from the Slutsky 
equation. Thus, stochastic dominance approach based on EV requires no more 
information than that using consumer surplus, which has been popular in applied 
welfare analyses. 
3. Consumer Surplus, Compensating Variation and SSD Rules 
We have shown that for given ordinal preferences an SSD relationship 
between two induced distributions of EV results in a unanimous preference among 
all income risk averters for one price prospect to another. In this section we 
investigate whether a similar SSD rule on the induced distributions of CS or CV 
is valid for ranking price prospects for all income risk averters with the same 
ordinal preferences. 
If the price of X changes from s to p, the Marshallian consumer surplus 
from the price change is 
p 
A(s,p,l) = f X(P,l)dP. 
s 
(7) 
On the other hand, compensating variation C for this price change is implicitly 
defined by 
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V(p,l - C) = V(s,l). 
More explicitly, compensating variation can be written 
C(s,p,I) = e(p, V(p,l)) - !._ (8) 
Assume that X is a normal good with a nonnegative income effect (X1 ?:. 0). 
Figure l illustrates the relationship between three alternative measures of welfare 
change when the price falls from s to p. The Marshallian demand curve is 
denoted by X(p,I). If the income effect is positive, the compensated demand 
curve labeled Ds - which preserves the utility level at V(s,l) - is steeper than 
X(p,I). Similarly, the compensated demand curve Dp associated with a utility level 
V(p,l) is also steeper than X(p,l) and lies to the right of Ds. 
The Marshallian consumer surplus from this price change is represented by 
area (samp). Compensating variation and equivalent variation from this price 
change are represented by area (sacp) and area (semp), respectively. Thus, if the 
price falls from s to p and XI ?:. 0, then 
w(s,p,I) ?:. A(s,p,I) ?:. C(s,p,I) > 0, for all p < s. (9) 
Alternatively, if the price rises from s to p and x 1 ?:. 0, then 
w(s,p,l) !l A(s,p,I) !l C(s,p,I) < 0, for all p > s. (9') 
Since w, A and C are moving in the same direction, for given values of the 
stable price s and income I, equivalent variation can be written as w = w(p ), and 
similarly, consumer surplus as A = A(p). Let p = h(A) be the conditional- on s 
and I - inverse consumer surplus function. Then 
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Figure 1. Relationship between three alternative measures of welfare change when price falls from 
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where the arguments s and I are held constant and hence are suppressed for 
notational convenience. Since w is decreasing in p, which in turn is decreasing 
in A, W(A) is monotone increasing in A. Thus, the indirect utility function 
V(s,I + W(A)) 
is monotone increasing in A, but is in general neither convex nor concave in A. 
Let V AA = {V(s,I + W(A)): VA > 0 and V AA s. 0) be the class of all indirect 
utility functions that are monotone increasing and concave in A. Let F(A) and 
G(A) be the induced distributions of CS, derived from F(p) and G(p), respectively. 
Let 
A A 
F*(A) = f F(t)dt, G*(A) = f G(t)dt, 
c c 
where c is a positive constant such that the cumulative distribution of consumer 
surplus at c, F(c) and G(c), are both zero. Then a straightforward application of 
Hada~ and Russell's (1969) SSD rule implies 
iff E~V(s,I + W(A)) ~ Et;V(s,l + W(A)) 
for all V E V AA· ( ll) 
However, our main interest is ranking price prospects for the class of 
income risk averters, Vu. and not for the class V AA· Differentiating ( 11) with 
respect to A twice gives 
The necessary and sufficient condition for V AA and Vu to be the identical class 
is that VAA must be nonpositive for all Vn s. 0. That is, W#(A) must be zero, 
and hence W(A) must be a linear function, i.e., 
12 
W(A) ~ o + {3A 
for some constants, o and {3. Since W(A) is monotone increasing in A, {3 must be 
positive. Moreover, w(s,p,I) = A(s,p,I) ~ C(s,p,l) = 0 for all I, if p = s. This 
implies that o is zero. 
We now show that {3 must be unity. From (9}, we obtain 
w(s,p,l) = {JA(s,p,l) ?:. A(s,p,l) for all p < s, ( 12) 
which implies J3?:. I. Similarly, from (9'), 
w(s,p,I) = {JA(s,p,l) ~ A(s,p,l) for all p > s, ( 12') 
which implies {3 ~ 1. Thus, a = 0 and {3 = I are necessary and sufficient 
conditions for V AA = Vn. That is, the two classes are identical if and only if 
the income effect, X[, is zero. In this case, EV coincides with es and ev. 
Similar arguments can be made to show that income effect X[ must be zero for 
Vn ~Vee"' (V(s,l + W(e)}: Ve::::. o and Vee~ 0}. 
PROPOSITION 3: The SSD rules for the induced distributions of CS and ev can 
be used to rank uncertain price prospects for all income risk averters with 
identical ordinal preferences, if and only if the income effect X[ is zero. 
A comparison of our result with the existing literature can be made for the 
case of zero income effect. Let R "" - IVu/VI be the Arrow-Pratt relative risk 
aversion index. If the consumer is risk neutral, then R ~ ~ (= 0) and hence the 
marginal utility of income is invariant with respect to the random price. In this 
case, expected consumer surplus (ECS) can be used to rank uncertain price 
prospects, a result predicted by Turnovsky, Shalit and Schmitz (1980). Moreover, 
since R = 2!) ( = 0), expected compensating variation (ECS) can be used not only 
13 
to rank a stable price and an uncertain price prospect - which requires R = 2ry -
but also to rank any nondegenerate price prospects, as shown by Helms ( 1984 ). If 
the consumer is risk averse (and the income effect is zero), then the SSD rules 
for the induced distributions of CS or CV yield...a correct ranking of uncertain 
price prospects. 
If the income elasticity of demand is not zero, then only the SSD rule for 
the induced distributions of EV provides a correct ranking of uncertain price 
prospects for all income risk averse consumers. The only situation in which the 
SSD rules for CS or CV yield a correct ranking of uncertain price prospects is 
when the income effect is zero, i.e., when CS and CV coincide with EV. 
5. Ranking of Price Prospects with Heterogenous Ordinal Preferences 
The ranking of price prospects via the induced distributions of EV is 
difficult when consumers have different ordinal preferences. The functional form 
of w(s,p,I) depends on the ordinal preferences or the shape demand function 
X(p,I). Since a given price prospect yields different distributions of equivalent 
variations for consumers with different ordinal preferences, a unanimous ranking 
of price prospects is generally infeasible. However, it is possible to obtain a 
unanimous ranking of price prospects for some proper subsets of risk averse 
consumers with different ordinal preferences. Let 
p 
F*(p) = I F(t)dt, 
0 
p 
G•(p) = I G(t)dt. 
0 
To facilitate the ranking of price prospects we define first degree stochastic price 
dominance (FSPD) and second degree stochastic price dominance (SSPD): 
Definition 1': F(p) D1 G(p) if F(p) ?. G(p) for all p and the strict 
inequality holds for some p. 
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Definition 2': F(p) D2 G(p} if F"(p) ~ G•(p) for all p and the strict 
inequality holds for some p. 
Since consumers with different ordinal preferences have different EV 
functions, we compare price prospects directly. Let F(p) be the set of all price 
prospects. To avoid using different symbols, let a and b now denote respectively 
the lower and upper bounds of the range of the price prospect, i.e., F(a) = 0 and 
F(b) = I for all F(p) E F(p). Expected utility of a price prospect F(p) is given by 
b 
EfV(p,I} = f V(p,l)dF(p). 
a 
The difference in expected utilities between two prospects, F(p) and G(p ), is 
b 
EfV(p,l)- EGV(p,l) =- f Yp(p,l}(F(p)- G(p)] 
a 
(I 3) 
since F(b) = G(b) = 1. Let V P " {V(p,I): V p < 0}. From Roy's identity, V p = 
- VrX. V p is negative for all indirect utility functions V E Yr. and hence Vr " 
V p· Thus, we have the following FSPD rule: 
PROPOSITION 4: F(p) Dt G(p} iff EfV(p,I) ~ EG V(p,I} 
for all V E Vr. 
Next, let V PP " {V(p,I): V P < 0, V pp ~ 0} be the class of indirect utility 
functions that are monotone decreasing and convex in p. Integrating (I 3) by 
parts yields 
p 
EfV(p,I) - EGV(p,I) =- Yp(b,I)[F(b)- G(b}] + f Ypp(p,I}[F*(p} - G•(p)]dp. 
a 
PROPOSITION 5: F(p) D2 G(p} iff EfV(p,l) ~ EG V(p,I) for all V E V pp· 
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Although VP"' VJ, the classes Ypp and Vn are different. Using Ypi =- VIXI 
- VuX. we obtain a result, originally due Turnovsky, Shalit and Schmitz (1980): 
where ry "' (aX;ai)(I/X) is the income elasticity of demand, < " - (aXjap)(p/X) is 
the price elasticity of demand and s " pX/I is the budget share of commodity X. 
Thus, the class V pp excludes consumers that are too risk averse (R 2:. ry + </S) 
and includes mildly risk averse consumers (R s. ry + </s). Moreover, it also 
includes risk neutral as well as risk loving consumers (R s. 0). 
We now restrict our attention to two proper subsets of risk averse 
consumers. Observe that Vn is the union of three sets, A, Band C where 
A " (V(p,I): V E VI, R S. ry + </s), 
B " (V(p,I): V E V1, R 2:. ry + </s), 
C " (V(p,I): V E VI, R > ry + </s for some p, R < ry + </s for some p'). 
PROPOSITION 5': If F(p) D2 G(p), then EFV(p,I) 2:. EGV(p,I) for all V E A. 
Conflicting preferences among risk averse consumers are revealed when 
comparing two price prospects with the same mean. Note that F(p) and G(p) have 
the same mean if and only if F*(b) = G*(b). Given the same mean, the difference 
in expected utilities reduces to 
p 
EFV(p,I) - EGV(p,I) = f V pp(p,I)[F*(p) - G*(p)]dp. 
a 
This implies that consumers with class A utility functions and those with class B 
utility functions will have opposing rankings of price prospects with the same 
mean:8 
16 
PROPOSITION 6: Assume that F(p) and G(p) have the same mean. Then 
F(p) D2 G(p) implies EFV(p,I);::, EGV(p,l) for all V E A, and 
EFV(p,l) s: EG V(p,I) for all V E B. 
If two price prospects have the same mean, individuals with class A utility 
functions unanimously prefer the price prospect that is second degree dominant, 
while those in class B prefer the dominated price prospect. This proposition 
indicates that some restrictions must still be placed on ordinal properties (e.g. on 
the magnitudes of price and income elasticities and budget shares) to rank price 
prospects for consumers with different tastes. 
S. Concluding Remarks 
This paper investigates how stochastic dominance rules can be applied to 
consumer welfare analysis. Using the demand curve of the representative 
consumer the emphasis in the literature to date has been on comparisons of 
Marshallian consumer surplus for certain and uncertain price prospects. Recently, 
Turnovsky, Shalit and Schmitz ( 1980) demonstrated that a stringent restriction 
must be placed on ordinal preferences for expected consumer surplus to yield a 
ranking of price prospects consistent with that based on expected utility. Thus, 
alternative operational rules for ordering price prospects must be developed to 
evaluate the benefits of price stabilization policies and other commodity programs 
that alter price distributions. For instance, stabilization programs in the United 
States and the European Economic Community not only eliminate downside price 
risks but also shift the price distribution via supply response (Gardner, 1987). 
There are two main obstacles to ranking price prospects for consumers 
exhibiting income risk aversion, one arising from differences in ordinal 
preferences and the other from nonconvexity of the indirect utility function in 
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prices. The second degree stochastic price dominance (SSPD) rule does not yield 
a unanimous ranking of price prospects for risk averse consumers with different 
ordinal preferences. We have shown that if two price prospects have the same 
mean price and second degree dominance holds, the risk averse consumers will be 
split between two classes with conflicting rankings of price prospects. 
For many policy problems in applied welfare analyses, expected consumer 
surplus has been used to evaluate the benefits from price stabilization. With the 
implicit assumption of identical ordinal preferences, the demand curve of the 
representative consumer is often used to estimate consumer surplus. We have 
shown that the SSD rule on the induced distributions of EV is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for all income risk averters with identical ordinal preferences 
to achieve a unanimous ranking of price prospects. The SSD rules on the induced 
distributions of CS and CV, however, yield a valid ranking of price prospects only 
if the income elasticity of demand is zero. Since EV, CS and EV are all derived 
from the same demand curve, the SSD rule on EV requires no more information 
than the SSD rule on consumer surplus or the expected consumer surplus 
criterion. Moreover, the SSD rule on EV is valid for all income risk averters 
without imposing restrictions on the income elasticity of demand. Insofar as the 
form of the utility function is not known, these two attractive features of the 
SSD rule on EV makes it an operationally useful rule for comparing consumer 
welfare under alternative price stabilization policies. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. See Whitmore (1970) for third degree stochastic dominance rule, which can 
be used to rank income prospects for a subset of risk averters with positive third 
derivatives of the utility function. 
2. For instance, see Baron (1970) and Sandmo (1971) for the impacts of price 
uncertainty on the behavior of the competitive firm. For general applications of 
stochastic dominance on the theory of the firm, see Hadar and Russell (1978). 
3. This is particularly due to Willig (1976) who showed that if income effect is 
small CS fairly well approximates both CV and EV. 
4. Helms (1984) also shows that the relative risk aversion index and the income 
elasticity of demand must be both zero for ECV to yield a valid ranking of 
nondegenerate price prospects. The ECV criterion is more restrictive than the 
ECS criterion, since the latter only requires R = 17, not necessarily equal to zero. 
5. See Anderson (1979) and Helms (1985b) for the use of ex ante compensating 
and equivalent variations. Since they are implicitly defined using expected utility, 
they are also consistent with the latter criterion. 
6. Since the indirect utility function is monotone decreasing in price for all y, 
the ranking of EVs under price certainty is also independent of income. 
7. Since the indirect utility function is monotone decreasing in price, first 
degree stochastic dominance (FSD) rule can be directly applied to price 
distributions. However, we include the FSD rule for the induced distributions of 
EV in order to develop the SSD rule for income risk averse consumers shortly. 
8. Analytically, this case for SSPD with the same mean price resembles the 
mean preserving spread developed by Rothschild and Stiglitz ( 1970), except the 
former applies to price prospects. 
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